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Abstract 
Some evidence points to the procyclicality of leverage among financial institutions 
leading to aggregate volatility. This procyclicality occurs when financial institutions 
finance their assets with non-equity funding (i.e., debt financed asset expansions). 
Wholesale funding is an important source of market-based funding that allows some 
institutions to quickly adjust their leverage. As such, financial institutions that rely on 
wholesale funding are expected to have higher degrees of leverage procyclicality. Using 
high frequency balance sheet data for the universe of banks, this study tries to identify (i) 
if such a positive link exists between the assets and leverage in Canada, (ii) how 
wholesale funding plays a role for this link, and (iii) market and macroeconomic factors 
associated with this link. The findings of the empirical analysis suggest that a strong 
positive link exists between asset growth and leverage growth, and the use to wholesale 
funding is an important determinant of this relationship. Furthermore, liquidity of several 
short-term funding markets matters for procyclicality of leverage. 
JEL classification: G21, G28 
Bank classification: Financial stability; Financial system regulation and policies; Recent 
economic and financial developments 
Résumé 
Certaines données semblent indiquer que la procyclicité du levier des institutions 
financières contribue à la volatilité globale. Cette procyclicité apparaît lorsque 
l’expansion des actifs de ces institutions est financée par l’endettement plutôt que par 
l’émission d’actions. Source importante de mobilisation de fonds sur les marchés, le 
financement de gros permet à certaines institutions de réajuster rapidement leur levier. En 
conséquence, on devrait observer plus de procyclicité pour la volatilité des institutions 
financières qui s’appuient sur ce mode de financement. En utilisant des données à haute 
fréquence des bilans de l’univers bancaire, les auteurs cherchent à déterminer 1) si cette 
relation positive entre les actifs et le levier existe au Canada, 2) en quoi le financement de 
gros joue un rôle dans cette relation, et 3) quels facteurs, macroéconomiques et liés aux 
marchés, sont associés à cette relation. Il ressort de leur analyse empirique qu’une 
relation positive étroite unit la croissance des actifs et celle du levier, et que le recours au 
financement de gros est un déterminant de premier plan de cette relation. En outre, la 
procyclicité du levier est influencée par le degré de liquidité de plusieurs marchés de 
financement à court terme. 
Classification JEL : G21, G28 
Classification de la Banque : Stabilité financière; Réglementation et politiques relatives 
au système financier; Évolution économique et financière récente 1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the recent nancial crisis, the high levels of leverage among nancial institutions
has widely been identied as one of the major causes of the crisis. This has focused attention on
both how nancial institutions manage their leverage ratios (dened as assets divided by equity)
and on what kind of regulatory actions might be required to prevent the build up of excessive levels
of leverage in the nancial sector. Given the nature and the severity of the recent nancial crisis,
leverage has quickly become one of the focal points of both the academic research and policy-oriented
discussions related to nancial stability.1
While the slow build up of leverage over several years among nancial institutions is an important
issue, some studies also identify the higher frequency movement of leverage as important. In this re-
gard, one major question has been raised: Is leverage procyclical with respect to economic activities?
Adrian and Shin (2010) study procyclicality of nancial institution leverage in the United States
and nd evidence that such procyclicality can contribute to aggregate volatility. One channel in
which this procyclicality can be observed is when a nancial institution actively manages its balance
sheet with respect to changes in the value of equity. For example, when the value of equity increases
due to a rise in the prices of some marked-to-market assets, the nancial institution's leverage ratio
decreases. If the nancial institution actively manages its balance sheet, it can raise non-equity
liabilities and lever back up. In this process, the newly raised liabilities are invested in new assets
leading to a positive relationship between changes in leverage and in balance sheet size. As prices of
assets tend to increase during booms and decrease during busts, leverage becomes procyclical.
This paper focuses on the interaction of leverage procyclicality with the use of wholesale funding,
and how macroeconomic and market environments drive such interactions. The degree of procycli-
cality is not constant across dierent types of nancial institutions and with respect to the changes
in macroeconomic and market environments. Financial institutions that use wholesale funding (e.g.,
institutional deposits, repos, commercial paper and banker's acceptances) display high degrees of
procyclicality as these market-based funds are readily available at short notice for quick adjustments
to leverage. However, the crisis disrupted short-term wholesale funding markets, revealing the high
funding liquidity risks of these funds. With reduced access to wholesale funding, nancial institutions
lost the ability to adjust leverage easily and quickly, which dampened the degree of procyclicality.
Specically, we have two main objectives. First, we show that leverage of Canadian nancial
institutions is procyclical (i.e., positive correlations between leverage and balance sheet size) and
1See Committee on the Global Financial System (2009) for an international policy discussion.
1that the degree of procyclicality depends on the usage of wholesale funding. Second, we identify
macroeconomic and market variables that are important for the degree of procyclicality. The empir-
ical strategy chosen to achieve these goals is a two-step method, similar to the approach outlined by
Kashyap and Stein (2000) in their work on the banking lending channel of monetary policy. The rst
step cross-sectionally estimates the degree of procyclicality of leverage based on monthly bank-level
balance sheet data for all federally chartered deposit taking institutions in Canada over the period
1994-2009. The analysis for the rst objective is derived from the outcome of this step. Then, the
second step tries to determine if and how the degree of procyclicality changes over time following
macroeconomic and market-wide changes. The results from this step are used for the discussion of
the second objective.
With respect to the rst objective, we nd strong procyclicality of leverage (i.e., positive re-
lationship between changes in leverage and changes in balance sheet size). In addition, we nd
signicantly higher degrees of procyclicality among nancial institutions that use more wholesale
funding over those that use less. This conrms the ndings by Adrian and Shin (2010) that leverage
among U.S. investment banks, who mainly rely on market-based wholesale funding to fund their
investment activities, is strongly procyclical. They do not nd such leverage procyclicality for com-
mercial banks who rely less on wholesale funding. Secondly, we nd that degrees of procyclicality
change with liquidity in short-term wholesale funding markets, where market liquidity is measured as
either the trading volume or the volume of outstanding instruments. Specically, for high wholesale
funding users, we nd that procyclicality is high when the liquidity of the repo and the banker's
acceptance markets is also high. As these funding sources are important for high wholesale funding
users, when the markets become illiquid, their ability to quickly adjust leverage declines, leading
to weaker procyclicality of leverage. This result is also consistent with Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) who provide a theory that links market liquidity (i.e., the ease with which an asset is traded)
and funding liquidity (i.e., the ease with which funds are obtained) through the margin requirements
for nancial intermediaries. Since margin requirements for nancial institutions to raise funds (e.g.,
haircuts on collateral and discounts on bank debts) can increase during downturns, available funds
for investment decrease, reducing market liquidity. Such market and funding illiquidity would show
up as weaker procyclicality of leverage, as the nancial institution's ability to adjust leverage and
investment declines. We observe weaker procyclicality with illiquid market conditions only for those
nancial institutions that rely on short-term wholesale funding markets.
Our analysis of the ndings leads to several policy discussions. First, Canadian nancial institu-
tions we analyze all face a regulatory leverage limit.2 One may argue that our procyclicality result
2The Oce of Superintendent of Financial Institutions regulates and supervises federally chartered institutions in
Canada.
2is an outcome of nancial institutions facing the binding leverage limit. When nancial institutions
attempt to remain at the bound of the leverage limit, any exogenously driven deviation from the
limit (e.g., a shock to asset prices or the value of equity) may be met by an endogenous reaction
by the nancial institutions to return to the pre-shock level, which in the process could enhance
procyclical movements. In the rst step of the empirical method discussed above, we control for po-
tential eects of the leverage limit on procyclicality. Even after controlling for the regulatory limit,
leverage is procyclical. Hence, other regulations may be necessary to control procyclicality. Some
of the new regulations under discussion may reduce this procyclicality. For example, in September
2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has announced a substantial strength-
ening of existing capital requirements, including potential counter-cyclical capital buers, where the
required capital increases during booms and decreases during busts. Such a regulation would directly
reduce leverage procyclicality. In addition, the BCBS has been discussing directly restricting banks'
balance-sheet liquidity-risk management. In December 2009, the BCBS has published a consultative
report on the framework for liquidity management that can be applied internationally.3 Moreover,
there is a complementary move to build a resilient market infrastructure to stabilize the volatility of
these markets.4 Even in the face of strong procyclicality, if the market is resilient to negative shocks,
the severity of market and funding liquidity problems would be reduced.
Secondly, despite the similarity in the procyclicality of leverage between the Canadian nancial
institutions in the analysis and the U.S. investment banks in Adrian and Shin (2010), most of the
Canadian nancial institutions in the analysis are full-service banks whose business models are quite
dierent from those of the U.S. investment banks. On one hand, it is surprising to nd such similarity
in procyclicality of leverage between these two dierent groups of institutions. On the other hand,
the severity of this issue may be lower for Canadian banks as they typically hold other less price-
sensitive assets and liabilities such as non-securitized loans on the asset side of the balance sheet and
retail deposits on the liability side, in contrast to U.S. investment banks that mainly hold securities
for trading on the asset side and short-term market-based funding on the liability side. These less
price-sensitive instruments could serve as a cushion in downturns.
Our paper is related to several other literatures. Regarding wholesale funding of banks, Haung
and Ratnovski (2010) analyze a model with a tradeo of using wholesale funding vs. retail deposits.
On one hand, wholesale funding improves eciency as wholesale nanciers monitor banks. The
monitoring incentives of the nanciers, however, sensitively depends on the available information
set, which could lead to inecient liquidations. This study is similar to ours in spirit, since it also
3See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009).
4Such eort is currently underway in Canada. For example, a creation of the central counter party in repo trading
is being discussed.
3evaluates the decisions and the riskiness of banks under dierent funding structures (retail deposits
vs. wholesale funding). Our study is also related to the literature on the regulation of bank leverage.
As mentioned, banks in Canada face regulatory leverage limits; a bank-specic leverage ratio ceiling
called the \asset-to-capital multiple" or ACM limit. Blum (2008) provides a theoretical motivation
for leverage limits in a world where the supervisor knows that dierent types of banks (safe vs.
risky) exist, but it does not know the actual risk types of banks. In such a setting, asking banks
to assess and report their own risks (in a manner similar to Basel II) is not optimal, since risky
banks will have an incentive to understate their risks. Blum (2008) shows that having a simple
leverage ratio cap along with capital requirements based on banks' internal risk assessments can
result in truthful revelations of banks' risk levels. Geanakoplos (2010) theoretically analyzes adverse
eects of leverage uctuations in the environment where leverage is determined in an equilibrium
together with interest rates. The paper shows how leverage cycles damage the economy and argues
for regulations to control them. Bordeleau, Crawford, and Graham (2009) discuss the historical
evolution of regulatory leverage limits in Canada and analyze how large Canadian banks manage
leverage with respect to these limits. They nd some large banks maintain a buer between their
leverage and the regulatory limit.
The rest of the study is as follows: Section 2 presents some basic balance sheet arithmetic to
explain the link between asset growth and leverage growth. Section 3 provides a brief overview of
the Canadian banking sector between 1982 and 2009, along with a timeline of regulatory changes,
including the introduction and the evolution of the ACM limit. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5
explains the empirical methodology. Section 6 describes the results and Section 7 discusses our
robustness checks. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Asset Changes vs. Leverage Changes
Our ndings of leverage procyclicality is based on positive correlations between asset changes and
leverage changes.5 In this section, we discuss how such a positive correlation can emerge from a bank
actively managing its balance sheet. Furthermore, the basic balance sheet arithmetic below also
demonstrates how the strength of leverage procyclicality (i.e. the positive correlation between asset
growth and leverage growth) is inuenced by the funding sources used by a nancial intermediary
(wholesale funding vs. retail deposits). Consider the simplied balance sheets for two banks that
use dierent funding sources, where Bank 1 is funded by wholesale funding and Bank 2 by retail
deposits:
5Bank credits and hence bank's balance sheet sizes tend to increase during booms and decrease during busts.
4Bank 1 Bank 2
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Total Assets 200 Retail Deposits 0 Total Assets 200 Retail Deposits 190
Wholesale Funding 190 Wholesale Funding 0
Equity 10 Equity 10
The leverage ratio of a bank is L = A=E, where L is leverage, A is total assets and E is equity.
Given these balance sheets, the leverage ratio for both banks is 200=10 = 20. Now suppose that both
the size of the asset portfolio and the amount of equity rises by $2 for each bank. Such an increase in
assets and equity could be caused by the bank issuing new equity in order to purchase more assets,
or it can be a result of an increase in the price of marked-to-market securities, which gets reected in
the banks' net worth Adrian and Shin (2010). Under both scenarios, the leverage ratio will become
202=12 = 16:83 for both banks. The result is the following balance sheets:
Bank 1 Bank 2
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Total Assets 202 Retail Deposits 0 Total Assets 202 Retail Deposits 190
Wholesale Funding 190 Wholesale Funding 0
Equity 12 Equity 12
It is, however, possible that the banks will not remain passive and they will decide to \actively
manage" their balance sheets as shown in Adrian and Shin (2010). The banks could attempt to
return their leverage ratios to the previous level of 20, which can be done by raising more funds
and using these funds to purchase more assets (e.g., securities). Bank 1, with its access to liquid
wholesale funding markets, is likely to be able to raise the required funds ($38). On the other hand,
since Bank 2 depends exclusively on retail deposits, it will be less able to quickly raise funds, given
the \sluggish" nature of retail deposits. Assuming that Bank 2 is only able to raise half of the
required funds ($19) in a given period, the balance sheets of these two institutions become:6
Bank 1 Bank 2
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Total Assets 240 Retail Deposits 0 Total Assets 221 Retail Deposits 209
Wholesale Funding 228 Wholesale Funding 0
Equity 12 Equity 12
6This assumption features the key dierence between wholesale funding and retail deposits.
5Now the leverage ratio of Bank 1 is 240=12 = 20, whereas the leverage ratio of Bank 2 is
221=12 = 18:41. Furthermore, if the initial change in the value of equity is the result of an asset
price change with marked-to-market accounting, it would aect all banks with the same marked-
to-market security on the balance sheet. This initial increase in the asset price could result in a
further increase in the price of this security, and the value of the securities might appreciate further,
triggering another round of adjustments as described above. This is the \feedback eect" discussed
by Adrian and Shin (2010) (or similarly the \spiral eect" by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009))
since the increase in the value of the marked-to-marked assets (and the bank's desire to actively
manage its balance sheet) is the cause of the adjustment process and the possible spiral that follows.
This example illustrates two things: leverage is procyclical and leverage procyclicality is stronger
for banks that use wholesale funding (Bank 1). In the rst stage of the example, the change in
assets and leverage is identical for both banks: a relatively small increase in assets (1%) leads to a
fairly large drop in leverage (approximately 16%). In the second stage, however, both the balance
sheet size and leverage increase at a fast rate for Bank 1, since it is able to raise all of the funds
required to restore its old leverage ratio. The growth rates for assets and leverage both equal 19%,
approximately. On the other hand, assets and leverage grow at a slower pace for Bank 2, since it
is unable to raise as many funds as Bank 1. For Bank 2, the growth rates of assets and leverage
both approximately equal 9.4%. Given that the growth rates were identical for the two banks in the
rst stage, it is clear that the correlation between asset growth and leverage growth will be higher
for Bank 1 ([1%, -16%], [19%, 19%]) than for Bank 2 ([1%, -16%], [9.4%, 9.4%]). When extended to
additional stages, a feedback eect can generate a series of observations which will conrm positive
correlations for both banks (i.e., leverage procyclicality) and a higher correlation for Bank 1, the
wholesale funded bank. This is solely due to the fact that Bank 1 is able to quickly raise funds to
adjust its leverage.7
[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE]
Figure 1 shows the scatter-plots of annual leverage growth rate and asset growth rate for all
federally chartered Canadian commercial banks between 1994 and 2007 for the U.S. and between
1994 and 2009 for Canada.8 In this graph, each point corresponds to a bank-year combination. A
positive correlation is observed when the points are aligned along a positively sloped line { assets
and leverage change in the same direction. The correlation coecient is 0.734, a highly positive
7Intuitively, the correlations would be positive in this example because the contribution from the initial movements
in assets and leverage (i.e., a decrease in leverage and an increase in assets, a potential source of negative correlation)
is small as the asset change is very small.
8Trust and loan companies and commercial banks that were inactive/closed by the end of 2009 are excluded from
this graph. They are, however, included in the empirical analysis discussed below.
6relationship between changes in assets and changes in leverage. Our study focuses on Canadian
nancial institutions, however for a comparison, we plot the same graph for selected U.S. commercial
banks and savings & loans (S&L) institutions between 1993 and 2007 in Figure 2.9 The correlation
coecient is 0.212 in the U.S., a much smaller number than for Canada.10
Adrian and Shin (2010) present a similar scatter-plot for the average growth rates of assets and
liquidity for all U.S. commercial banks between 1963 to 2006. In their graph, however, there is
no positive relationship between asset growth and leverage growth. Furthermore, similar scatter-
plots presented by Panetta and Angelini (2009) do not show a positive asset growth-leverage growth
relationship in Germany, France, Italy and Japan. Interestingly, Panetta and Angelini (2009) do
observe a positive relationship between asset growth and leverage growth in the United Kingdom.
3 Canadian Banking Sector
In this section, we provide an overview of important regulatory developments (particularly the \asset-
to-capital multiple" or ACM limit) in Canada.1112 Following this overview, the empirical analysis
presented in Section 4 below will further examine the positive relationship between asset growth and
leverage growth in Canada.
3.1 Important Change in Regulatory Environment
An important feature of the Canadian banking sector is that the Bank Act, the legislation that
governs banks, includes a requirement for a periodic and formal review process of the rules and
regulations regarding nancial institutions. This \sunset provision" has led to a number of important
legislative amendments since 1980.13 We discuss one such regulation that is directly relevant for
our analysis. The 1987 Amendments to the Bank Act allowed banks, which already could have
subsidiaries in the areas of venture capital and mortgage lending, to invest in or own securities
9We include 24 U.S. depository institutions that form an approximate \peer group" of the Canadian commercial
banks in Figure 1. The criteria for the construction of this peer list is explained in Appendix A.
10Explaining the possible causes of the much stronger positive relationship between asset and leverage growth in
Canada (compared to the U.S., and other countries) are beyond the scope of this study. Given our focus on the role of
wholesale funding in determining leverage, however, a comparison between wholesale funding use by Canadian and U.S.
banks could be desirable. Unfortunately, constructing an \internationally comparable wholesale funding use" measure
is very dicult due to a lack of data. See Haung and Ratnovski (2010) and Hadley and Boecher (2007).
11The ACM limit is the regulatory denition of the leverage ratio used by the Oce of Superintendent of Financial
Institutions.
12A more elaborate picture of the Canadian banking sector and its regulatory environment is given in Appendix B.
13See Allen and Engert (2007).
7dealers, and to invest in corporate securities. All of the large and some of the small chartered banks
eventually acquired or founded a securities dealer. As a consequence, no large, independent Canadian
securities dealers remained by the mid-1990s. Thus, the nancial institutions in our analysis can
own investment banking subsidiaries. Our data consist of regulatory reports which give consolidated
nancial information and do not separately provide activities of dierent divisions and subsidiaries.14
3.2 Leverage Ratio Limits and Their Evolution
Another important feature of the Canadian banking sector is the presence of a regulatory leverage
ceiling. As discussed by Bordeleau, Crawford, and Graham (2009), Canada is one of the few countries
that has had a long-standing limit on leverage ratios. The leverage ceiling, known as the ACM limit,
was introduced in 1982, following a period of high leverage ratios among major Canadian banks.
Leverage is measured using the following regulatory denition in Canada:
Leverage =
Total balance sheet assets + Certain o-balance sheet assets
Total regulatory capital
Based on the overview provided by Bordeleau, Crawford, and Graham (2009), the evolution of
the ACM limit between 1994 and 2009 can be divided into two distinct periods:
 1991 to 1999: During this period a formal ACM limit of 20 was imposed. While the super-
visors used their discretionary powers to impose lower limits on smaller and/or newly founded
nancial institutions, it appears that the leverage ratio restriction was applied quite uniformly
at 20 during this period.
The supervisory bank data used in this study contains the ACM limits for 26 banks and 22
trust and loan companies for the period between 1997 Q4 and 1999 Q4 (ACM limit data is
unavailable for the period 1994Q1-1997Q3). Most of the 26 banks had an ACM limit of 20
during the entire period between 1997 Q4 and 1999 Q4 while some banks reported having an
ACM limit below 20. Similarly, most trust and loan companies had an ACM limit at 20, while
others reported an ACM limit below 20.
14This fact puts some of these nancial institutions closer to investment banks analyzed in Adrian and Shin (2010).
However, the U.S. banks in Figure 2 are also bank holding companies such that some of them own investment banking
subsidiaries. The positive correlation is still stronger among Canadian institutions than the U.S. banks.
8 2000 to Today: After 2000, banks that satisfy a certain set of criteria have been allowed to
increase their ACM limit to as high as 23. The standard ACM limit of 20 is still maintained,
although the regulators can (and do) apply a lower ACM limit to certain institutions.
The available data suggest that there was much less uniformity in the ACM limits set on
individual banks during this period. Currently, ACM limit data exists for 23 banks and 29
trust and loan companies for the period 2000 Q1 and 2009 Q4. Of these, the majority of banks
reported having an ACM limit of 20 during the entire period. Several banks had a limit above
20 for at least part of the period, while some banks reported a limit below 20 for the entire
period. Among the trust and loan companies, about half of them had a limit of 20 during the
entire period. Other trust and loan companies reported a limit below 20 at least once and/or a
limit above 20 for at least part of the period. Overall, it appears that the ACM limit was more
variable during this period compared to 1991-1999, with more nancial institutions having a
leverage ratio limit either above or below the standard limit of 20.
In their study of regulatory leverage constraints in Canada, Bordeleau, Crawford, and Graham
(2009) argue that the major Canadian banks do not like to operate too close to their limit. Instead,
these banks tend to keep a \leverage buer" in order to minimize the risk of balance sheet volatility
(such as trading activity) pushing leverage above the limit. The presence of such a buer between a
bank's leverage and its leverage limit can play a role in determining the link between asset growth
and leverage growth. This issue will be further discussed below.
4 Data
The bank balance sheet data used in this study comes from the Tri-Agency Database System (TDS) of
the Bank of Canada, Oce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) and the Canadian
Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC). The TDS database contains the monthly balance sheet and
o-balance sheet information, along with the quarterly income statement information, reported by
nancial institutions. Although there exist data going back to January 1981, some series did not
begin until after 2000, while other series were terminated and/or replaced to accounting rule changes.
As a result, only certain broad measures can be tracked across the entire sample period such as: total
assets, total equity, retail deposits, wholesale deposits, total loans and total securities. Most of the
subitems under these broad categories become available only much later than 1981. This imposes
some constraints on the design of the empirical analysis, which will be discussed below. Nevertheless,
TDS is an extensive database and it has the advantage of providing balance sheet data at a higher
frequency than the data used in other studies in the literature. This study uses data that covers the
9period January 1994 to December 2009.
Although TDS provides data on a universe of 224 domestic banks, foreign bank subsidiaries,
foreign bank branches and trust and loan companies (active or inactive), some of these institutions
had to be eliminated from the study. The foreign bank branches that were established in Canada
following the regulatory changes in 1999 had to be eliminated, since they do not report any equity
(making it impossible to calculate their leverage ratio). Also, banks and trust and loan companies
that are fully owned subsidiaries of a chartered bank or a trust and loan company were also eliminated,
since their parent institution already reports a consolidated balance sheet.15 The remaining 136
Canadian nancial institutions form the sample that was used in the study. Overall, the data set
contains 12,949 bank-month combinations.
The bank-level balance sheet data is also supplemented by macroeconomic and market-wide
variables, such as GDP growth rate, and market liquidity measures. These variables were all obtained
from the \Bank of Canada Banking and Financial Statistics."16
5 Empirical Analysis: Methodology
As discussed above, the goals of this study are (i) to identify the link between leverage growth
and asset growth among Canadian nancial institutions, (ii) to determine how this link interacts
with banks' funding (specically their use of wholesale funds) and (iii) to examine whether shocks
in wholesale funding markets aect the leverage growth-asset growth relationship. The empirical
strategy chosen to achieve these goals is a two-step method, similar to the approach outlined by
Kashyap and Stein (2000) in their work on the banking lending channel of monetary policy and
subsequently used by Campello (2002) and Certorelli and Goldberg (2008).
In broad terms, the outline of the two-step approach is as follows: in the rst step, the sensitivity
of leverage growth to asset growth, i.e., the degree of leverage procyclicality, (@Leverage=@Assets)
is cross-sectionally estimated using bank-level balance sheet data only. Then, the second step of the
analysis tries to determine if and how these sensitivities change over time following macroeconomic
and market-wide liquidity shocks, i.e., changes in the degree of procyclicality over time. Therefore,
only macroeconomic and market-wide nancial variables are used in this second step.
15However, if a bank or a trust and loan company operated independently any time between 1994 and 2009 before
being acquired, then it was included in the sample for the period during which it was an independent entity. There
were 13 such cases.
16Available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/bfsgen.html.
10As discussed above, while identifying the link between leverage growth and asset growth, the
degree of heterogeneity among Canadian banks' funding portfolios also needs to be considered.17 It
is possible that banks with access to liquid wholesale funding markets can adjust their leverage ratios
more quickly, compared to banks that rely on illiquid funding sources (such as retail deposits) or
equity, which can be more costly to raise. Accordingly, Canadian banks were categorized based on
how much wholesale funding they use. \Wholesale funding use" of a bank is thereby dened as:
%WSF =
Non-personal deposits + Repos + Banker's Acceptances
Total Liabilities + Equity
Using this denition, Canadian banks can be divided into three categories: (a) high degree of
wholesale funding users{High WSF, (b) low degree of wholesale funding users{Low WSF, and (c)
banks that don't use wholesale funds{No WSF. The latter category contains banks that are entirely
funded by equity.18 For banks that do use wholesale funding, the median of the %WSF ratio was
calculated for each month, and banks above (below) the median were placed in the High WSF (Low
WSF) group. This categorization was individually performed for each of the 192 months in the
sample (January 1994 to December 2009).
Such a categorization naturally raises the issue of a bank's \access" to wholesale funding markets
vs. its \use" of such funds. Specically, a bank that chooses not to raise any wholesale funds would
be in the No WSF group along with a bank that has no access to wholesale funding markets. The
former bank, however, can decide at any time to access wholesale funding markets, switching either
to the Low WSF or High WSF group. The patterns in the data, however, suggest that banks do
not frequently change their intensity of wholesale funding use. Table 1 presents a simple \transition
matrix" showing the probability of a bank remaining in the same category vs. switching to a dierent
category between time t and t + 1. As seen from this transition matrix, switches between categories
is a relatively rare event: out of a total of 12,949 bank-month combinations, there are only 604 cases
where a bank switches categories between t and t + 1. As such, the concerns related to frequent
switches between categories appear to be alleviated for the Canadian case.19
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
17From this point on, the term \bank" will be used to represent both trust and loan companies, and chartered banks.
18The sample does contain a few instances where a bank is 100% equity funded.
19As the threshold level of wholesale funding use changes over time, this categorization captures the macroeconomic
and market-wide movements fairly well. It is this reason that many banks stay in the same category with high
probabilities.
11Table 2 below presents some summary statistics for the entire sample of banks, along with dierent
groups of banks based on their wholesale funding use. In addition to the number of banks, summary
statistics for leverage, leverage growth (Leverage) and asset growth (Assets) are also presented.
The variation in the number of banks within the No WSF group during the sample period is due to
the nature of the data set. TDS does not contain balance sheet data for trust and loan companies
before January 1996. Since most of the No WSF banks are trust and loan companies, their absence
from the data set during the January 1994 - December 1995 period causes the No WSF category to
have very few observations. Once the trust and loan companies enter the data set in January 1996,
most of this variation is eliminated. The summary statistics in Table 2 suggest that \non-user" banks
have lower leverage ratios compared to the rest, but the leverage behaviour of the High WSF and
Low WSF banks are similar. Although the average monthly rates of change in assets and leverage
are smaller than 1%, there is some variation both within and between dierent groups of banks,
which is what we elaborate on below in the empirical analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Finally, Table 3 provides an average balance-sheet portfolio of all banks and for each wholesale
funding group in December, 2009. The numbers are un-weighted averages as percentage of total
assets across banks. The average bank has half of its assets in loans and the rest in cash, securities
and others. On the funding side, two-thirds of assets are funded by non-equity funding, retail
deposits, wholesale funding and others. Across wholesale funding groups, note that the percentage
of wholesale funding increases with its \use" by design. The average bank in the High WSF group
funds 57% of assets by wholesale funding. For the Low WSF group, wholesale funding makes up
only 9% of total assets. Retail deposits are the important source of funding for the Low WSF group,
amounting to 58% of total assets. The No WSF group tends to nance assets mostly by equity, on
average 61% of total assets. Loans make up most of the asset side for High and Low WSF banks
with 59% and 61% of total assets, respectively. The High WSF group owns a much higher fraction
of riskier non-mortgage loans than safer mortgage loans (46% and 17%, respectively) relative to the
Low WSF group (26% and 35%, respectively). The average No WSF bank holds relatively more cash
and government bonds which are generally the most liquid assets. Among assets that are subject to
the market price risk, there are private sector securities and derivative related securities. The High
and Low WSF groups have 11% and 7% of their total assets, respectively, in these securities.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
125.1 Empirical Analysis: First Step
In the rst step of the empirical analysis, we run two sets of regressions. The procyclicality of leverage
is analyzed for all banks together in the rst set and for three groups in the second. These two sets
of regressions are independently run for each month and shown below as Equation 1 for all banks
and Equation 2 for analyzing wholesale funding groups, respectively:
ln(Leverage)i;t =   (1)
+ 1  ln(Assets)i;t
+ 2  ln(ACM Limit)i;t
+ 3  Liquidi;t
+ 4  Mergeri;t
+ 5  ln(Leverage)i;t 1 + t;
ln(Leverage)i;t =  1 +  2  Lowi;t +  3  Noi;t (2)
+ 1  ln(Assets)i;t
+ 2  ln(Assets)i;t  Lowi;t
+ 3  ln(Assets)i;t  Noi;t
+ 4  ln(ACM Limit)i;t
+ 5  Liquidi;t
+ 6  Mergeri;t
+ 7  ln(Leverage)i;t 1 + t;
where Leveragei;t = (Assetsi;t=Total Regulatory Capitali;t) and Assetsi;t is the total balance sheet
assets of bank i at time t. This rst step regression is very similar to the regressions run by Adrian
and Shin (2010), since the dependent variable is the growth rate of leverage, and both the lagged
leverage ratio (in logs) and the growth rate of assets are included as independent variables. However
in Equation 2, in order to account for heterogeneity in the link between leverage and asset growth
among banks, Log(Assetsi;t) is also interacted with the wholesale-funding-use group dummies,
where the High WSF group is the omitted category.20
The rst step regressions given in Equations 1 and 2 also include a number of control variables.
20The presence of the interacted terms in Equation 2 requires the inclusion of the \wholesale funding use category"
dummies by themselves in the regression as well.
13A bank with a liquid asset portfolio might be more likely to increase its leverage ratio, since it would
be able to quickly sell assets if it were unable to renance some of its debt in the future. Therefore,
Liquidi;t = (Securities ownedi;t=Assetsi;t) is included in the rst step regression as a control variable.
Mergeri;t is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bank was involved in a merger or
acquisition during the previous six months, since such activity is likely to impact leverage.
The nal independent variable is ACM Limiti;t, which is the leverage ratio ceiling placed on a
bank at time t. As discussed above, the data used in this study does not contain information on
the ACM limits of individual banks for 1994Q1 - 1997Q3, and for the period between 1997Q4 and
2009Q4, ACM limits are observed only for some banks. In order to include the ACM limit in the
rst step regression, the missing ACM limit data was generated using a simple regression procedure.
This procedure, which is explained in more detail in Appendix B, involves regressing the ACM limits
observed in the data set on a number of bank-specic variables and using the regression coecients
to generate tted values for the missing ACM limits.
The estimation of Equations 1 and 2 separately for each month involves running 192 individual
regressions per equation. The estimated coecients for Log(Assets)i;t and its interactions are then
used as dependent variables in the second step regression discussed below. In this setting, 1 from
Equation 1 measures the correlation between leverage and asset growth for all banks combined. In
addition, 1 from Equation 2 is the correlation between leverage and asset growth for high wholesale
funding users, whereas (1+2) and (1+3) capture this relationship for the low wholesale funding
users and no wholesale funding users, respectively. In essence, the rst step of the analysis generates
the estimates of a separate time series of (@Leverage=@Assets) for all banks combined and for
each wholesale funding group, with 192 observations in each time series.
5.2 Empirical Analysis: Second Step
This second step involves the estimation of the following time series regression, separately, for all
banks combined and for each WSF group:
14j;t =  +
1 X
q=0
1q  ln(Repo)t q +
1 X
q=0
2q  ln(BA)t q +
1 X
q=0















+ 7  Overnight Ratet + 8  Year Endt + j;t;
where j represents the dierent groupings of Canadian banks: j = 1 for all banks and j = 2; 3 and 4
based on their wholesale funding use, high, low and non, respectively. j;t is constructed from the
estimates in the rst step such that 1;t = 1;t, 2;t = 1;t, 3;t = 1;t +1;t, and 4;t = 1;t +1;t. As
discussed above, the second step of the empirical analysis only uses macroeconomic and market-wide
nancial variables in order to estimate the relationships between these variables and the changes
in the degree of leverage procyclicality. Some of these variables contain information on market and
funding liquidity, which could play an important role in determining the asset growth - leverage
growth relationship. As shown in the balance sheet examples above, the procyclicality of leverage
is inuenced by how easily a bank can raise funds (funding liquidity) and how easily assets can
be purchased or sold (market liquidity). The log change in the total volume of transactions in the
repo market (ln(Repo)) and the log change in the amount of outstanding banker's acceptances
(ln(BA)) control changes in funding liquidity. Meanwhile, the log change in the total amount of
outstanding corporate short-term paper (ln(CP)) captures changes in market liquidity.21 All three
of these variables are normalized by the money supply (M2), in order to capture relative changes
in the size of repos, banker's acceptances (BA) and commercial paper (CP) markets relative to the
more \traditional" source of funding, namely money. If the BA, CP and repo markets are growing
faster than the money supply, this can be a signal of \market-based nancial intermediaries" playing
a larger role in nancial intermediation.22 As such, these variables are of particular interest in the
second step of the analysis.23 A nal measure of liquidity is the change in the spread between the 3
21Separating outstanding commercial paper volumes into asset-backed vs. not asset-backed commercial paper can
be illustrative; unfortunately, such disaggregated data is not available.
22Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010) nd that the security broker-dealer (who relies on market-based funding) leverage
growth is one of the important variables in predicting excess returns and that balance sheet variables of these institutions
also provide information about future real economic activities.
23Liquidity in BA and CP markets can be also be measured by their bid-ask spreads, since a liquid (illiquid) market
will be more likely to have smaller (larger) bid-ask spreads. Although bid-ask spread data is available for Canadian
BA and CP markets, including these variables along with, or instead of, the volume-based measures discussed above
does not yield major changes in the ndings.
15to 5 year Canadian Treasury rate and the 3 to 5 year corporate bond rate (Defaultt). An increase
in this \default spread" might indicate a ight to quality and lower liquidity in the corporate bond
markets.
The liquidity risk faced by Canadian banks is partially captured by the change in the slope of the
yield curve. Term is change in the spread between the Canadian government bonds with a maturity
of 10 years or more and the 3-month Canadian Treasury Bill. Given that ination expectations are
anchored at 2% by the ination targeting monetary policy in Canada, a steepening of the yield curve
will create opportunities for banks to borrow short-term funds and invest in long-term assets. Banks
that follow this strategy can be expected to have a large and positive asset growth-leverage growth
sensitivity, since the new assets would be purchased by debt. Furthermore, if many banks choose to
pursue this strategy, this could result in the value of long-term securities to increase, which could
potentially be a trigger for the \feedback eect" discussed by Adrian and Shin (2010). The obvious
downside of this balance-sheet management approach is the liquidity risk that the bank may not
be able to rollover its short-term debt before the returns on the long-term assets are realized. In
addition, in order to capture the cost of raising equity, log changes in the Toronto Stock Exchange
Financial Index (ln(TSX Fin)) are included. If the nancial stocks are on an upward trend, then
the cost of raising equity may be lower, compared to debt, weakening the link between leverage and
asset growth.
Furthermore, the monthly growth rate of GDP (ln(GDP)) is included in the second step, since
higher growth rates could reduce the costs of rolling over short-term debt, resulting in more assets
being purchased by debt. Under this scenario, higher rates of GDP growth will strengthen the asset
growth-leverage growth relationship in the Canadian banking sector. The status of monetary policy
is captured by Overnight Rate, which is the overnight rate targeted by the Bank of Canada. Finally,
Year End is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the months of October and December.
October marks the end of the scal year for some Canadian banks while other banks use December.
It is possible that banks may choose to de-lever before the end of the scal year, independent of their
asset portfolio. If so, then leverage growth can be less sensitive to asset growth towards the end of
the scal year.24
Before we present the results, it is necessary to discuss why this particular method was cho-
sen. The obvious alternative to the two-step procedure is to nest Equation 3 into Equation 2 (or
24As seen in Equation 3 , the rst lag of all independent variables (except Year End and Overnight Rate) are included
in the analysis as well. Studies such as Campello (2002) tend to include longer lags, but unfortunately since some of
the data is unavailable for before January 1994, including additional lags places a burden on both the number of
observations and degrees of freedom.
16Equation 1) and run a panel regression. Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Campello (2002) discuss the
benets of the two-step methodology that allows for a dierent shock to have an impact on leverage
in each month. Therefore, it becomes less likely that the results of the rst step (coecients of
Log(Assets)i;t and its interactions) are inuenced by unobserved factors. For example, the two-
step procedure is able to account for a shock that leads to an increase in the leverage ratios of all
banks in a given month. Furthermore, if Equation 3 is nested into Equation 2, then this would force
the variables in Equation 3 to eect leverage growth in a linear fashion, creating a more restricted
structure. Finally, the two-step approach allows for the link between asset growth and leverage
growth (i.e., the degree of procyclicality) to vary across time. Given the relatively long time-span of
this study, it is reasonable to assume that the relationship between leverage and asset growth have
changed over time. Some evidence of the coecients of Log(Assets)i;t and its interactions varying
across time will be presented below, further validating the two-step approach. However, the two-step
approach has its disadvantages. As discussed by Kashyap and Stein (2000), a two-step specication
tends have lower statistical power compared to a one-step method. Therefore, results of a one-step,
panel data specication that nests Equation 3 into Equation 2 will also be discussed below as a
robustness check.
6 Results
6.1 First Step Results
As discussed above, the rst step of the analysis involves the estimation of Equations 1 and 2 for
each month.25 During the estimation, in a manner similar to Campello (2002), observations where
jln(Leveragei;t)j  66% and/or jln(Assetsi;t)j  66% were eliminated. This ensures that the
results are not driven by outliers. Furthermore, the rst six months of observations after an entry
and the last six months of observations before an exit were eliminated, since the periods immediately
following an entry or immediately preceding can involve large swings in assets and equity. The
number of observations in each regression varied between 54 and 75 banks, as shown in Table 2.
While analyzing the rst step results, three important questions need to be answered: (i) What
is the relationship between leverage growth and asset growth in the Canadian banking sector (or is
there procyclicality of leverage)? (ii) Does the relationship dier by the wholesale funding use of
a bank (or does the degree of procyclicality dier by groups)? (iii) Does the relationship between
leverage growth and asset growth evolve over time (or does the degree of procyclicality change over
25We correct for heteroscedasticity in these estimations.)
17time)?26
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Table 4 summarizes the results of the coecient estimates. The table shows the mean and the
variance of 192 sets of the estimated coecients in Equations 1 and 2 for all banks and wholesale
funding groups, respectively. As discussed above, we focus on the estimates of 1, 1, 1 + 2,
and 1 + 3, and hence we mainly discuss these results. We interpret the estimated results of 1,
1, 1 + 2, and 1 + 3 in Table 4 as follows. For all banks, when assets change by 1%, leverage
changes by 0.833% in the same direction on average across time. Among High WSF banks, leverage
changes by 0.933% with the asset change of 1%, whereas leverage of Low WSF and No WSF banks
change by 0.786% (= 0:933   0:146) and 0.661% (= 0:933   0:272), respectively. As these are all
positive numbers, leverage and assets move together, i.e., leverage is procyclical. Furthermore, as
the wholesale funding use increases, leverage and assets move more closely to each other (i.e., the
number becomes closer to 1), implying that the degree of procyclicality increases with the wholesale
funding use.27
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
The variance column for wholesale funding groups in Table 4 shows that the variance of these
192 estimated parameters decrease with the wholesale funding use. Figure 3 visually shows this.
The gure contains kernel density estimates based on 192 estimates of 1 on the left panel, and 1,
1+2, and 1+3 on the right panel. We observe a long left tail in all gures, implying that in some
months assets and leverage moved in opposite directions. As seen in Section 2, this happens through
passive balance sheet management or alternatively when asset purchases are funded by equity. On
the right panel in Figure 3, we also observe that the estimates of 1 (i.e., for High WSF banks) show
less variation than those of 1 +2 (i.e., for Low WSF banks), and the estimates of 1 +3 (i.e., for
No WSF banks) show the most variation among three groups.
26The answer to this question would justify the two-step approach, which allows for the coecients of ln(Assets)i;t
and its interactions to vary across time.
27Another potentially important determinant of leverage growth in the Canadian banking sector is the ACM limit.
The mean of the coecient estimate on ln(ACM Limit) in Table 4 suggest that the ACM limit seems to have
some positive impact on how banks adjust their leverage. When ln(ACM Limit) increases by one unit, the average
increase in leverage is about 0.015% under both Equations 1 and 2. The \buer" that some banks keep between their
actual leverage ratios and the leverage ceiling (as discussed by Bordeleau, Crawford, and Graham (2009)) is a possible
explanation for this nding. If most banks keep such a buer, then they would be able to increase their leverage with
their balance sheet size without worrying about violating their ceiling. In times of decreasing leverage in the banking
sector, it is natural that the ceiling has no impact on the (negative) rate of leverage growth. This may be a reason
that the 192 estimates of the coecient of ln(ACM Limit) display high volatility over time in both equations, i.e., the
high variances relative to the means in Table 4.
18Tables 5 and 6 further summarize the main ndings of the rst-step regressions and provide some
answers to the evolution of leverage growth-asset growth sensitivities over time. Table 5 presents
the mean of the estimated leverage growth-asset growth sensitivities (i.e., the degree of leverage
procyclicality) for all banks and each wholesale funding group, during the entire sample period,
as well as during two sub-sample periods (the 1990s and 2000s). Also presented are statistical
tests comparing the means and variances of the estimated sensitivities for the same category across
dierent time-periods.28
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
The analysis of the two sub-periods in Table 5 suggests the asset growth-leverage growth link
weakened over time, especially, for banks that use little or no wholesale funding. This observation
is conrmed by the tests comparing the mean sensitivities across dierent time periods. The null
hypothesis of equal means across dierent sub-periods is rejected for these banks. Furthermore, for
the Low WSF group, the null hypothesis of the estimated coecients (1+2) having equal variance
across time is also rejected. This time-variation in the means and the variances of the estimated
coecients across time for all three categories conrms the benets of the two-step approach over
the one-step approach.
Table 6 presents comparisons of mean leverage growth-asset growth sensitivities across dierent
wholesale funding use categories for dierent periods. The comparisons conrm dierences in the
leverage growth-asset growth link across the dierent groups over the entire sample period, and
especially during the 2000s. As seen on Panel B of Table 6, the dierences between the mean
sensitivities of the three groups were not as signicant during the 1990s, suggesting that most of the
divergence occurred sometime during the 2000s. Whether these changes were due to macroeconomic
or nancial shocks will be the focus of the second step of the empirical analysis. Nevertheless, the big
dierences between the High WSF group and the other two groups are not very surprising. Based
on the balance sheet examples discussed above, the link between asset growth and leverage growth
is likely to be stronger for banks that are able to change their leverage ratio quickly. Banks that
access wholesale funding markets can raise or retire debt more quickly, since the wholesale funding
markets tend to be more liquid compared to retail deposit markets in normal times.29
28Since the number of no wholesale funding user banks is very small during January 1994 and December 1995, the
estimated coecients for these 24 months are mostly driven by movements in the leverage ratios of one or two banks. As
a result, the asset growth-leverage growth sensitivities for this group are not taken into consideration in Tables 5 and 6.
29The signicant variations across these dierent groups of Canadian banks also validate the inclusion of the wholesale
funding use interactions in the rst step of the analysis.
19[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
In summary, the rst step of the analysis suggests that the relationship between leverage growth
and asset growth in the Canadian banking sector (a) is positive, i.e., leverage is procyclical, (b) is
dependent on wholesale funding use of banks, i.e., the degree of procyclicality increases with wholesale
funding use, and (c) has evolved over time. Specically, during the 1990s, changes in leverage ratios
of all Canadian banks were relatively more procyclical and sensitive to changes in balance sheet size
(as seen in Table 5, mean sensitivities are higher than 0.85 for all three categories during this sub-
period). There was a divergence in the 2000s, caused by the weakening of the asset growth-leverage
growth relationship among banks that use little or no wholesale funding. Changes in leverage ratios of
banks that use high levels of wholesale funding, however, continued to be very sensitive to changes in
balance sheet size. It is possible that the asset growth-leverage growth correlations have a negative
time trend, due to the expansion of non-intermediated funding markets reducing the traditional
growth opportunities of banks (such as commercial loans) and limiting balance sheet growth rates.
However, for the high wholesale funding banks, the development of wholesale funding markets and
the use of these funds may have given them new growth opportunities and kept them from lowering
the sensitivities relative to other banks. In the second step, we analyze these possibilities.
6.2 Second Step Results
The second step of the empirical analysis investigates the macroeconomic and market-wide variables
associated with the change in the degree of leverage procyclicality of Canadian banks over time. This
involves the time-series estimation of Equation 3 separately for each bank group: All, High WSF,
Low WSF and No WSF banks.
The results of the second step analysis are given in Table 7 below. These result strongly suggest
that both funding and market liquidity matter for the change in the degree of leverage procyclicality
in the Canadian banking sector. For example with all banks, the degree of leverage procyclicality
increases when the liquidity of both the repo and the BA markets contemporaneously increases
(i.e., the positive and signicant coecient of ln(Repo) and ln(BA)). Specically, as the repo
market transaction volume increases by 1%, the co-movement of leverage and assets (measured by the
estimated coecients of ln(Assets) in Equation 1) increase by 0.0019, and similarly by 0.0197 for
an 1% increase in the outstanding BA. In addition, the default and term spreads seem to be important
for the degree of leverage procyclicality (i.e., the signicant coecient of Default and Term 1).
With an increase in default risks, the degree of leverage procyclicality decreases, weakening the link
between leverage and assets. This can be intuitive if the observed leverage-assets link arises out
20of the greater risk-taking behaviour by banks. A lagged term spread increase tends to occur with
an increase in the leverage procyclicality. A higher term spread may create an increased incentive
to hold greater maturity mismatches by purchasing long-term assets with short-term debts, leading
to a stronger positive link between leverage and assets. Finally, an increase in the overnight rate
coincides with a higher degree of procyclicality. As discussed below, No WSF banks appear to drive
this result.
Regarding the results on dierent wholesale funding groups, changes in liquidity in the repo
market (as measured by turnover) have positive and signicant coecients for both high and low
WSF banks. This nding conrms Adrian and Shin (2010), who argue that the active management
of a nancial institution's balance sheet requires frequent access to repo markets. This is especially
true for U.S. investment banks, whose asset growth-leverage growth relationship is highly positive.
The positive and signicant coecient of ln(Repo) suggests that more liquid repo markets make it
easier for wholesale funding users to take positions in nancial markets, perhaps fueling the \feedback
eect" of Adrian and Shin (2010) to take place in some parts of the Canadian banking sector.
For the High WSF group, the asset growth-leverage growth relationship is also stronger (more
positive) when the BA market is more liquid, due to an increase in the amount of outstanding BA.
In Canada, large and established banks use BA as an important source of funding. As most of such
banks likely belong to the high wholesale funding group, the result is reasonable. Meanwhile, the
growth rate of outstanding CP has a positive and signicant coecient for the Low WSF group.
Increased liquidity in CP or BA markets can signal easier access to asset and funding markets
for these institutions, which can then be used to purchase assets, leading to higher procyclicality.
Alternatively, higher turnover can also cause an appreciation in the value of the CP held by Low
WSF banks, which can trigger the \feedback eect" discussed by Adrian and Shin (2010). Taken
together, the coecients for ln(Repo), ln(BA), and ln(CP) point to easier access to wholesale
funds (i.e. when the markets are more liquid) resulting in more assets being nanced with debt and
a higher correlation between asset growth and leverage growth.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
The impact of macroeconomic factors on the asset growth-leverage growth relationship is limited
among the No WSF group. The asset growth-leverage growth relationship is positive with respect
to GDP for this group. Additionally, the overnight rate has a positive and signicant coecient.
The positive coecients of ln(GDP) and Overnight Rate could both be capturing easier access to
retail deposits and an abundance of growth opportunities during a booming economy. Finally, the
21No WSF banks tend to reduce their leverage procyclicality (and liquidity risk) towards the end of
the scal year.
Overall, the second step of the analysis suggests that the degree of leverage procyclicality among
Canadian banks is signicantly impacted by liquidity-related macroeconomic and market-wide vari-
ables. Liquidity in the repo, BA and CP markets plays at least some role in determining the
magnitude of this relationship, depending on the degree of wholesale funding use. For both High
WSF and Low WSF banks, the repo market matters. Since these banks might be pursuing active
trading strategies, their ability to use repo markets to take trading positions can have an impact on
their leverage behaviours. The CP and BA markets also may determine the asset growth-leverage
growth relationship, since borrowing funds for asset purchases are more likely to take place in these
markets.
7 Robustness Checks
7.1 Noise and outliers in \rst step" results
One concern related to the \two-step" methodology is that the dependent variables used in the
second-step may contain noise (or sampling variation). Given that our sample is smaller than of
Kashyap and Stein (2000) or Campello (2002), it is possible that some of the coecients estimated
in the rst-step (i.e. degrees of procyclicality) contain noise, which in turn, reduces the signicance
of the second-step regressions.
This concern is addressed by transforming the outliers among the rst-step coecients, which
can reduce the degree of variability and limit the presence of noise in the second-step. As seen in the
distributions of these estimated coecients in Figure 3, such extreme values are almost always on
the left-side of the distribution. Accordingly, the transformation of the outliers is achieved by a one-
sided \winsorising", where all the observations below the 5th percentile is set at the 5th percentile.
Then the second-step regressions are re-estimated using these transformed dependent variables. The
results are given in Table 8 below.
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
The ndings in Table 8 are quite similar to those in Table 7, which suggests that the results are
22not driven by outliers or noise.30 The signicance levels of the regressions somewhat improve with
the transformation of the outliers, although it is clear that winsorising the dependent variable does
not eliminate all of the noise associated with the rst-step regressions.
7.2 Panel regression for the \rst step"
Another way of dealing with the issue of potential noise in the rst-step coecients would be to take
advantage of the panel nature of our data. A comparison of the coecients obtained from a single
panel regression to the mean of the rst-step coecients given in Table 4 can help determine whether
the ndings of the two-step methodology are driven by noise/outliers or not.
Accordingly, the rst-step equations given in Equations 1 and 2 were estimated using bank-
level xed eects. Similar to the criteria used in the initial rst step regressions, outliers with
jln(Leveragei;t)j  66% and/or jln(Assetsi;t)j  66%, and banks with fewer than 40 observations
were eliminated. The results of these xed-eects regressions are given in Table 9 below.
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE]
The results of the rst-step panel regressions are broadly in line with the earlier ndings dis-
cussed above. High wholesale funding using banks have a signicantly higher degree of procyclicality
compared to the other two groups. The coecient estimates are also close to the mean regression
coecients reported in Table 4 as well, especially for the high- and low-wholesale funding use groups.
Overall, these panel regressions seem to conrm the ndings of our two-step methodology.
7.3 A \One-Step" Panel Data Approach
As discussed above, an alternative approach to the \two-step" methodology of Kashyap and Stein
(2000) is to nest the second step equation (Equation 3) into the rst step (Equation 2).31 This \one-
step" approach will take advantage of the panel nature of the data and may have more statistical
power. Therefore, this specication can serve as a useful robustness check.
30One notable exception is the result regarding the overnight rate. The sign of the coecient changes for No WSF
banks from positive in Table 7 to negative in Table 8.
31Alternatively, we could nest Equation 3 into Equation 1, however we focus on the analysis of wholesale funding
groups in our robustness checks.
23In specifying the one-step model, attention needs to be paid to the nature of the dependent
variable. As discussed above, the main goals of this study are to determine the correlation between
asset growth and leverage growth in Canadian banking sector, and to examine whether this corre-
lation depends on banks' funding portfolios. Accordingly, the dependent variable for the one-step
specication needs to reect the correlation between asset growth and leverage growth for each bank
at each time period. Based on this need, the dependent variable was specied as:
yi;t =
(ln(Assets)i;t   A)  (ln(Leverage)i;t   L)
SDA  SDL
where A is the mean asset growth rate and L is the mean leverage growth rate. Similarly,
SDA and SDL represent the standard deviations of the asset growth rate and leverage growth
rate, respectively. These means and standard deviations can be calculated either (i) across banks for
each time period (for time t across all i), or (ii) across time periods for each bank (for bank i across
all t).32
Using this dependent variable, the following equation can be estimated, where the main variables
of interest are interacted with wholesale funding use dummies:
32This specication of the dependent variable is intuitively motivated from the formula for sample correlations: Pn
i=1 (ai  a)(bi  b)
(n 1)SDaSDb for two random variables, a and b, where n is the sample size. The dependent variable is one element
of the summation in this formula. Hence, this specication would allow us to interpret how the right-hand-side variables
eect the correlation between changes in leverage and assets.
24yi;t =  i +  1  Lowi;t +  2  Noi;t (4)
+ 11  ln(Repo)t + 12ln(Repo)t  Lowi;t + 13ln(Repo)t  Noi;t
+ 21  ln(BA)t + 22ln(BA)t  Lowi;t + 23ln(BA)t  Noi;t
+ 31  ln(CP)t + 32ln(CP)t  Lowi;t + 33ln(CP)t  Noi;t
+ 41  Defaultt + 42Defaultt  Lowi;t + 43Defaultt  Noi;t
+ 6  Termt + 7  ln(TSX Fin)t
+ 71  ln(GDP)t + 72ln(GDP)t  Lowi;t + 73ln(GDP)t  Noi;t
+ 81  Overnight Ratet + 82  Overnight Ratet  Lowi;t + 83  Overnight Ratet  Noi;t
+ 91  Year Endi;t + 92  Year Endi;t  Lowi;t + 93  Year Endi;t  Noi;t
+ !1  ln(Leverage)i;t 1 + !2  ln(ACMLimit)i;t + !3  Mergeri;t + i;t
In Equation 4, the variables with the  coecients are for the macroeconomic/market-wide vari-
ables, whereas the ! coecients are for the bank-level variables.  i is a bank-specic eect. As the
dependent variable can be calculated in two ways, this equation was estimated under two method-
ologies. First, the means and standard deviations of ln(Leverage) and ln(Assets) were calculated for
each bank across time and Equation 4 was estimated using a random-eects specication. Then, the
means and standard deviations were calculated for each time period, across all banks and Equation 4
was estimated using a xed-eects specication (both of these choices were conrmed by Hausman
tests). Banks with less than 40 observations were dropped from the sample in each case. To ensure
that the ndings are not driven by outliers, dependent variable observations in the 1st and 99th
percentiles of the two distributions were winsorised.
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE]
The results of the two dierent one-step specications, which are presented in Table 10, are
broadly in line with the ndings of the two-step analysis discussed above. The asset growth-leverage
growth correlations are higher for High WSF banks, since Lowi;t and Noi;t have negative coecients
(except for Noi;t in (ii)). Furthermore, liquidity in funding markets still matters for the asset growth-
leverage growth link, since liquidity, especially, in the BA market has signicant coecients for High
and Low WSF groups in both specications. Although the ndings in Table 7 and 10 do not exactly
match, the general conclusions of the two-step analysis concerning the impact of wholesale funding
25use and liquidity on Canadian banks' leverage behaviour are conrmed.33
8 Conclusion
We study the extent of procyclicality of leverage in the Canadian banking sector. The study is
motivated by the theory developed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and empirically studied
in Adrian and Shin (2010) that a link exists between funding liquidity and market liquidity through
nancial institutions' balance-sheet management. Our analysis utilizes a variation of the two-step
empirical estimation method rst proposed by Kashyap and Stein (2000). We use monthly balance
sheet data covering almost two decades and we establish that leverage is highly procyclical among
Canadian nancial institutions. This link depends on banks' use of wholesale funding markets and
it has evolved over time. The degree of procyclicality among banks that are more dependent on
wholesale funding is higher, e.g., leverage rises more rapidly as assets increase. Furthermore, the gap
in the degree of procyclicality between high wholesale funding users and the rest of the banking sector
has grown larger during the 2000s. We then investigate macroeconomic and market-wide variables
associated with leverage procyclicality and its divergence between dierent wholesale funding groups.
This \second step" of the empirical analysis suggests that leverage becomes more procyclical during
times of increased liquidity in repo, BA and CP markets.
The current regulation in Canada places a limit on the leverage ratio. This regulation is designed
to prevent excessively high leverage but does not directly control the change in leverage. Given
that procyclicality of leverage could lead to aggregate volatility, our ndings imply that this current
leverage regulation may not adequately address potential consequences of market and funding liq-
uidity risks. Other regulations, such as those being discussed in the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, that enforce counter-cyclical capital holdings and directly restrict banks' balance-sheet
liquidity-risk management may have a potential in addressing this issue. However, the consideration
of the potential costs of such regulations needs to be taken into account.
In this study, we document and highlight an important issue (i.e., procyclicality of leverage) in
the Canadian nancial sector. Important questions still remain. Why do Canadian banks behave
similarly to U.S. investment banks even though their business models are very dierent? The search
for potential causes of this observation is left for future research. Insights into this question would
contribute in the designing of new nancial sector regulations. This line of research would also help
33The only major dierences between the ndings of the two-step vs. the one-step analysis are that ln(Repo)t
does not have a positive and signicant coecient (for the High WSF group) and that none of the CP market-related
coecients are statistically signicant.
26to further our understanding of the behaviour of complex nancial institutions that are the focus of
recent regulatory reforms.
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29Figure 1: Annual change in assets and leverage in Canada (1994-2009).
























Figure 2: Annual change in assets and leverage in the U.S. (1994-2007).

























30Figure 3: Kernel Density Estimates of 1 from the regression model (1) on the left panel; and 1

















31Table 1: \Transition matrix" showing switching patterns of banks among the dierent wholesale
funding use categories.
Group at t + 1
Group at t High WSF Low WSF No WSF
High WSF 96.29% 3.51% 0.2%
Low WSF 3.56% 94.22% 2.22%
No WSF 0.05% 3.84% 96.11%
Table 2: Summary statistics for all banks in the sample and each individual group of banks.
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
All Banks
# of banks 67.44 69 4.04 54 75
Leverage 9.33 9.40 5.38 0.96 24.15
Leverage -0.001 0.00 0.09 -0.66 0.63
Assets 0.006 0.004 0.08 -0.63 0.65
High WSF
# of banks 26.59 26 3.69 20 33
Leverage 10.56 9.93 4.47 1.58 24.15
Leverage -0.003 0.002 0.10 -0.62 0.63
Assets 0.004 0.006 0.09 -0.62 0.64
Low WSF
# of banks 26.06 25.5 3.65 19 32
Leverage 10.749 11.57 4.71 1.00 23.75
Leverage 0.0004 0.001 0.08 -0.64 0.63
Assets 0.009 0.007 0.07 0.63 0.65
No WSF
# of banks 14.79 13 7.97 1 30
Leverage 4.57 1.30 5.30 0.96 22.92
Leverage -0.0004 0.00 0.07 -0.66 0.60
Assets 0.004 0.002 0.07 -0.60 0.59
32Table 3: Average balance-sheet portfolios for each individual group of banks in percentage of total
assets, December 2009.
All Banks High WSF Low WSF No WSF
Total Assets 100 100 100 100
Cash 24 19 19 33
Loans 47 59 61 25
Mortgage 21 17 35 14
Non-mortgage 25 42 26 11
Securities 19 18 15 24
Public Sector 12 7 7 20
Private Sector 5 6 5 4
Derivative Related 2 5 2 0
Other Assets 10 4 6 17
Total Liabilities 67 89 80 39
Retail Deposit 35 21 58 28
Wholesale Funding 19 57 9 0
Other Debts 13 11 13 12
Equity 33 11 20 61
Table 4: Summary of the 192 individual rst-step regression results. Means and variances for all
coecients except \(Assets)  No" are calculated across the 192 individual regressions. The mean
and variance of \(Assets)  No" does not include the 24 estimated coecients for the years 1994
and 1995, since this group had very few banks during this period.
All Banks WSF Groups
Variable Mean Variance Mean Variance
ln(Assets) 0.833 0.062 0.933 0.039
(Assets)  Low -0.146 0.205
(Assets)  No -0.272 0.335
ln(Leverage) 1 -0.005 0.0001 -0.006 0.0001
ln(ACM Limit) 0.014 0.021 0.015 0.028
Liquid 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.004
Merger -0.003 0.0004 -0.002 0.0003
Low -0.0004 0.0002
No -0.010 0.005
33Table 5: Summary of rst step regression results, continued. Mean () and variance (2) for the
estimated leverage growth-asset growth sensitivities are reported for the entire sample period and two
sub-periods. The last two rows present tests for the equivalence of the means () and variances (2)
of the estimated coecients for the same category but across dierent subperiods. H0 : 2
90 = 2
00
reports the chi-squared test statistic for a Bartlett's test for equal variance across the two sub-periods.
H0 : 90 = 00 reports the results of a F* test for the equality of the sub-sample means (robust to
2
90 6= 2
00). The mean leverage growth-asset growth sensitivities for the No WSF group do not
include the estimated coecients for 1994 and 1995, since this group had very few banks in it during
this period. *** is signicant at 1% and ** represents signicance at 5%.
All High WSF Low WSF No WSF
Mean ()
Whole Sample (whole) 0.833 0.933 0.786 0.654
1990s (90) 0.930 0.952 0.872 0.915
2000s (00) 0.774 0.921 0.735 0.550
Variance (2)
Whole Sample (2
whole) 0.062 0.039 0.193 0.319
1990s (2
90) 0.023 0.029 0.078 0.257
2000s (2
00) 0.076 0.045 0.256 0.309
H0 : 2
90 = 2
00 13.79*** 4.41** 26.84*** 0.549
H0 : 90 = 00 25.36*** 1.23 5.90** 16.74***
Table 6: Comparison of mean leverage growth-asset growth sensitivities across dierent size categories
for (i) the entire sample and (ii) two sub-sample periods. The dierences in the mean sensitivities
are calculated as \Column i - Row j" and a Welch's t-test is performed with the null hypothesis of
\Mean dierence = 0" (robust to unequal sample variances). The mean dierence tests involving
the No WSF group only include observations from January 1996 and onwards, since this group had
too few banks in it prior to January 1996. *** is signicant at 1% and ** is signicant at 5%.
Panel A: Entire Sample Low WSF No WSF
High WSF 0.146*** 0.272***
Low WSF 0.117**
Panel B: The 1990s
High WSF 0.080** 0.028
Low WSF -0.053
Panel C: The 2000s
High WSF 0.186*** 0.370***
Low WSF 0.184***
34Table 7: Second-step regression results. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation corrected Newey-
West (one lag) standard errors. The regression for the No WSF group includes estimated asset
growth-leverage growth sensitivities from January 1996 and onwards only. *** is signicant at 1%,
** and * are signicant at 5% and 10% respectively.
All Banks High WSF Low WSF No WSF
Variable Coef S. E. Coef S. E. Coef S. E. Coef S. E.
ln(Repo) 0.190** 0.085 0.173** 0.077 0.331** 0.144 0.004 0.227
ln(Repo) 1 0.104 0.064 -0.050 0.066 0.025 0.122 0.192 0.139
ln(BA) 1.197** 0.562 0.183 0.414 0.585 1.226 0.116 1.338
ln(BA) 1 0.363 0.517 0.662* 0.381 0.637 1.025 -1.695 1.081
ln(CP) 0.0911 0.624 -0.262 0.439 -0.678 1.165 1.260 1.586
ln(CP) 1 0.656 0.529 -0.263 0.345 3.118* 1.654 -1.418 1.155
Default -0.137* 0.0707 -0.0509 0.059 -0.290** 0.130 -0.060 0.191
Default 1 -0.019 0.059 -0.020 0.058 -0.058 0.111 -0.006 0.204
Term -0.075 0.049 -0.085 0.057 -0.135 0.089 -0.151 0.157
Term 1 0.085** 0.042 0.039 0.032 0.154* 0.081 -0.023 0.190
ln(TSX Fin) -0.545 0.350 -0.221 0.229 -0.800 0.608 -0.367 0.799
ln(TSX Fin) 1 0.0709 0.366 -0.140 0.258 -0.042 0.644 0.519 0.892
ln(GDP) 0.043 0.038 0.033 0.032 -0.049 0.067 0.069 0.100
ln(GDP) 1 0.027 0.043 -0.053 0.036 -0.056 0.077 0.249** 0.099
Overnight Rate 0.026** 0.010 0.012 0.009 0.014 0.020 0.058* 0.035
Year End -0.025 0.061 0.060 0.050 0.013 0.105 -0.549*** 0.174
No. of obs. 190 190 190 168
F-Stat 2.53*** 1.56* 1.62* 2.50***
35Table 8: Second-step regression results with the dependent variables winsorised at the 5th percentile
(one-sided). Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation corrected Newey-West (one lag) standard errors.
*** is signicant at 1%, ** and * are signicant at 5% and 10% respectively.
All Banks High WSF Low WSF No WSF
Variable Coef S. E. Coef S. E. Coef S. E. Coef S. E.
ln(Repo) 0.142** 0.069 0.128** 0.055 0.240** 0.102 0.075 0.194
ln(Repo) 1 0.083 0.056 -0.067 0.052 0.019 0.104 0.224* 0.129
ln(BA) 0.695* 0.421 -0.154 0.329 0.257 0.723 -0.043 1.154
ln(BA) 1 0.253 0.436 0.576* 0.330 0.474 0.707 -1.471 0.968
ln(CP) 0.293 0.499 -0.123 0.391 -0.314 0.939 1.856 1.530
ln(CP) 1 0.670 0.462 -0.121 0.286 1.962 1.209 -0.342 1.071
Default -0.130** 0.064 -0.024 0.046 -0.263** 0.106 0.144 0.148
Default 1 -0.013 0.052 0.017 0.042 -0.047 0.091 0.223 0.160
Term -0.064 0.045 -0.061 0.038 -0.103 0.072 -0.044 0.123
Term 1 0.074* 0.038 0.029 0.029 0.108* 0.065 0.133 0.121
ln(TSX Fin) -0.563* 0.291 -0.178 0.180 -0.640 0.454 0.0003 0.806
ln(TSX Fin) 1 0.153 0.318 -0.021 0.191 -0.053 0.469 0.990 0.919
ln(GDP) 0.036 0.033 0.038 0.026 -0.015 0.051 0.081 0.032
ln(GDP) 1 0.025 0.042 -0.042 0.028 -0.012 0.065 0.233*** 0.082
Overnight Rate 0.023** 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.014 -0.048* 0.028
Year End -0.005 0.051 0.049 0.039 0.016 0.078 -0.408*** 0.118
Observations 190 190 190 190
F-stat 2.76*** 1.66* 1.93** 2.68***
36Table 9: Fixed-eects panel regression for the rst-step (all banks and banks grouped according to
wholesale funding use). Arbitrary serial correlation and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors
are reported. *** is signicant at 1%, ** and * are signicant at 5% and 10% respectively.
All Banks WSF Groups
Variable Coef. S. E. Coef. S. E.
ln(Assets) 0.816*** 0.046 0.928*** 0.014
ln(Assets)  Low -0.113** 0.047
ln(Assets)  No -0.493*** 0.157
ACM Limit -0.006 0.009 -0.003 0.009
Liquid -0.004 0.009 -0.002 0.011
Merger -0.014** 0.006 -0.015** 0.007
ln(Leverage 1) -0.014*** 0.003 -0.016*** 0.004
Low -0.005** 0.002
No -0.011** 0.005
Bank-specic Eects Fixed Fixed
No. of observations 12,293 12,293
No. of banks 103 103
37Table 10: One-step panel regression results, using the wholesale funding grouping for banks. Ar-
bitrary serial correlation and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported. Dependent
variable for (i) uses means and standard deviations across all banks for each time t. Dependent
variable for (ii) uses means and standard deviations across all time for each bank i. *** is signicant
at 1%, ** and * are signicant at 5% and 10% respectively.
(i) Across Banks (ii) Across Time
Variable Coef S. E. Coef S. E.
ln(Repo) -0.086 0.101 -0.055 0.093
ln(Repo)  Low 0.230 * 0.128 0.217 * 0.112
ln(Repo)  No 0.140 0.182 0.136 0.154
ln(BA) 2.438 ** 1.108 1.714 *** 0.628
ln(BA)  Low -3.837 *** 1.148 -2.190 ** 0.852
ln(BA)  No -2.645 ** 1.247 -1.509 1.000
ln(CP) 0.267 2.139 -0.417 1.167
ln(CP)  Low 1.273 2.317 0.883 1.406
ln(CP)  No 0.747 2.245 -0.255 1.380
Default 0.135 0.129 0.004 0.067
Default  Low -0.137 0.161 -0.055 0.102
Default  No -0.228 0.165 -0.235 ** 0.105
Term 0.011 0.061 -0.113 *** 0.039
ln(TSX Fin) 0.151 0.300 -0.110 0.245
ln(GDP) -0.019 0.092 -0.035 0.062
ln(GDP)  Low 0.116 0.114 0.121 0.090
ln(GDP)  No 0.008 0.124 0.131 0.092
Year End -0.069 0.105 0.273 *** 0.093
Year End  Low 0.014 0.125 0.039 0.126
Year End  No -0.067 0.194 -0.152 0.200
Overnight Rate -0.123 *** 0.033 -0.034 ** 0.016
Overnight Rate  Low 0.185 *** 0.046 0.070 *** 0.026
Overnight Rate  No 0.109 ** 0.052 0.028 0.039
ln(Leverage 1) 0.274 * 0.152 0.025 0.047
Liquid -0.044 0.278 0.003 0.120
ln(ACM Limit) 0.107 0.382 0.086 0.174
Merger 0.163 0.270 0.076 0.183
Low -0.814 *** 0.212 -0.355 *** 0.121
No -0.862 *** 0.320 -0.255 0.176
Bank-specic Eects Fixed Random
No. of observations 12,457 12,457
No. of banks 103 103
38Appendix
A Details of the \Peer List" of U.S. Financial Institutions
In order to construct the peer list, the Canadian commercial banks that were active as of 2009 Q2
were divided into separate categories based on (a) ownership criteria (domestic vs. foreign), (b)
business lines (retail, wholesale, investment banking, etc.) and (c) geographic scope (nationwide,
regional, online only, etc.). It should be stressed here that this peer list should not be considered
an exhaustive or comprehensive list of U.S. peers of Canadian banks. The goal of this exercise was
to make very basic comparisons of the asset growth-leverage growth relationship in the U.S. vs.
Canadian banking sectors.
While constructing these categories, the six major Canadian banks (the \Big Six") were consid-
ered to be in a category by themselves. Furthermore, a list of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs)
that are the likeliest U.S. peers for the Big Six has already been constructed by Allen, Engert, and
Liu (2006). This list of 11 U.S. BHCs was supplemented by the addition of Citigroup.
The peers of non-U.S. foreign banks subsidiaries operating in Canada are represented by the
subsidiaries of the same banks operating in the U.S. The peer for the small, specialized subsidiaries
of U.S. banks operating in Canada is the U.S. subsidiary of Caisses Desjardins, which is the largest
cooperative credit institution in Canada.34
The peers of domestically-owned Canadian regional banks were determined by a criteria of geo-
graphical concentration, as opposed to assets or number of branches. Peers of the remaining variety
of Canadian banks that operate primarily through online banking and ABM networks, and credit
cards-only banks were determined solely according to their specialized lines of business. The com-
plete list of the U.S institutions chosen and the categories they represent are given below. Balance
sheet data for these peer institutions were obtained from BankScope and the Financial Institutions
Examination Council's (FFIEC) Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR).
34Although Caisses Desjardins is not included in this study as a Canadian nancial institution, its subsidiary in the
U.S. is a good example of a small (three branch) foreign bank subsidiary concentrating on a niche business (nancial
needs of Canadian retirees in the state of Florida). In this sense, it is more representative of the small, niche U.S. bank
subsidiaries in Canada than the large Canadian bank subsidiaries in the U.S., such as TD Banknorth or Harris Bank.
Of course, since the U.S. subsidiaries in Canada concentrate on investment (and not retail) banking, Desjardins Bank
should not be considered as a perfect substitute.
39Table 11: List of U.S. peer institutions and their corresponding categories.
Category Canadian Example(s) U.S. Peer(s)
Big Six BMO; CIBC; Bank of America; Citigroup; U.S. Bankcorp.;
National Bank; FifthThird Bancorp.; JP Morgan Chase;
RBC; ScotiaBank; National City Corp.; Wachovia Corp.;
TD-Canada Trust Wells Fargo & Co.; PNC Financial Services Group;
Keycorp.; SunTrust Banks Inc.; BB&T Corp.
Domestic-owned Canadian Western; M&T Bank Corporation;
Regional Banks Laurentian Bank Sterling Savings Bank
Non-U.S. Foreign HSBC Canada; ING Direct; HSBC USA, NA; ING Bank;
Subsidiaries Bank of East Asia; Bank of East Asia, USA, NA;
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi;
UBS Bank Canada UBS Bank (USA)
U.S Foreign JP Morgan (Canada); Desjardins Bank NA
Subsidiaries Citibank Canada
Domestic-owned Citizens Bank of Canada; First Internet Bank of Indiana;
Retail Banks President's Choice Bank; Bank of Internet;
Manulife Bank of Canada; E*TRADE Bank
Credit Card Only Canadian Tire Bank Target National Bank
Banks
40B Regulatory Environment of Canadian Financial Sector
It can be argued that the Canadian banking sector has always had a relatively stable structure.
Historically (prior to 1980), the nancial system had ve pillars: chartered banks, trust and loan
companies, securities dealers, co-operative credit institutions, and life insurance companies. Of
these, federally chartered banks were historically involved in commercial lending, whereas trust and
loan companies specialized in collecting term deposits and making residential mortgage loans. Co-
operative credit institutions, which are chartered and regulated by the provinces, have traditionally
concentrated on retail deposits, residential mortgages and personal loans (Freedman, 1998).
Due to nationwide branch banking arrangements, the sector has always been dominated by a
few very large banks. Currently, around 88.5% of all banking sector assets are held by six large
banks, known as the \Big Six."35 A number of smaller foreign or domestically-owned banks provide
competition to these six very large banks in certain geographic areas or lines of business. For example,
a few smaller regional banks are very active in Western Canada and Quebec, while a few internet-
only banks provide competition for small retail deposits. Finally, according to Hardy (2009), foreign
owned banks compete with the Big Six in investment banking. Therefore, the Canadian banking
sector can be characterized as having a dominant core and a competitive fringe.
Another important feature of the Canadian banking sector is that the \Bank Act", which is the
legislation that governs banks, includes a requirement for a periodic and formal review process of the
rules and regulations regarding nancial institutions. This \sunset provision" has led to a number
of important legislative amendments since 1980 (Allen and Engert, 2007). The regulatory changes
that are of particular interest to this study, are briey highlighted below.36
 1987 Amendments: These amendments allowed banks, which already could have subsidiaries
in the areas of venture capital and mortgage lending, to invest in (or own) securities dealers
and to invest in corporate securities. All of the very large and some of the smaller chartered
banks eventually either acquired or founded a securities dealer. As a consequence, no large,
independent Canadian securities dealers remained by the mid-1990s.
 1992 Amendments: Chartered banks were allowed to own trust companies and enter the
insurance business. These amendments and the weak nancial condition of the trust industry,
35They are: Bank of Montreal (BMO), Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), National Bank, Royal Bank
of Canada (RBC), ScotiaBank, TD-Canada Trust.
36It should be stressed here that the following is not an exhaustive list of bank regulation changes, but only those
that are relevant to this study. This discussion draws heavily from Freedman (1998) and Allen and Engert (2007).
41caused an wave of acquisitions, where most trust companies were purchased by chartered banks.
Despite the 1987 and 1992 amendments, Canadian banks did not become fully universal banks,
since investments in non-nancial businesses continued to be restricted.
 1999: Although not mandated by the \sunset clause", these regulatory changes allowed foreign
banks to open branches in Canada without having to establish a subsidiary. Foreign branches,
however, were strictly limited in raising retail deposits.
 2002 Amendments: Chartered banks were allowed to own nance companies.
 2005: New accounting rules concerning marked-to-market accounting were introduced. Banks
were required to recognize securities held for trading or available for sale at fair value. Securities
being held to maturity were required to be valued at cost.
42C Estimation of the \Missing" ACM Limit Data
As discussed above, the supervisory data used in this study only contains partial information on the
ocial leverage ratio requirements (the Asset-Capital Multiple, or ACM, limit). There is no ACM
limit information available for any bank for the period January 1994 - September 1997, while ACM
limit data exists for only some banks for the period October 1997 - December 2009. Overall, ACM
limit data is available for 2,903 out of the total 12,984 bank-month observations used in the study.
In order to generate the \missing" ACM limit data, a simple regression-based procedure was used.
First, the existing ACM limits (for the period Oct. 1997 - Dec. 2009) were regressed on a number
of bank-specic factors, which are likely to inuence the regulators' decisions:
ACM Limiti =   + 1Assetsi + 2Liquidi + 3Big Sixi + 4Foreigni + 5T&Li + 6Subi + j (5)
The size of the bank (Assetsi) has been identied in Bordeleau, Crawford, and Graham (2009)
as one of the factors that determine whether the regulators set an ACM limit below the \standard"
limit of 20. In addition, the level of liquid assets (Liquidi) that are held by the bank can inuence its
ACM limit, since a more liquid portfolio can allow a bank to have a higher level of leverage without
being exposed to excessive liquidity risk. Dummy variables that capture whether the bank is one of
the dominant six banks (Big Sixi), a foreign bank (Foreigni) or a trust and loan company (T&Li)
are also included, since they can explain the age, reputation and the business model of dierent types
of banks that contribute to the regulators' decision on the appropriate ACM limit. Finally, Subi is a
dummy variable that captures whether bank i is a fully-owned subsidiary of another bank or not.37
The estimation of (5) involves running two cross-sectional regressions: one for the period January
1994 - December 1999 (when a relatively strict ACM limit of 20 was imposed on almost all banks)
and another for January 2000 - December 2009 (when ACM limits could go as high as 23). As such,
all of the variables in (5) are period averages.38 Since the ACM limit has both a (theoretical) lower
bound of one and an (actual) upper bound of 20 or 23, depending on the period, a Tobit approach
is more appropriate. The results of these two Tobit regressions are given in Table 12 below.
37In Canada, it is common for fully-owned subsidiaries to have a dierent ACM limit than their parents. Although
these subsidiaries are left out of the main empirical analysis discussed above, we opted to include them in the estimation
of ACM limit data, in an attempt to increase the number of available ACM limit observations.
38A panel data specication with bank-specic xed eects and period dummies yield similar results).
43After the estimation of (5) for the two dierent subperiods, the missing ACM limits can now be
estimated by generating tted values using the coecients in Table 12. Since most of the available
ACM limits are integers, the tted values were rounded to the nearest integer. These \generated"
ACM limits were then combined with the \actual" ACM limit data to be used as an explanatory
variable in the main empirical analysis.
It should be noted here that this approach has some obvious drawbacks, mainly because it leads
to measurement error. However, the generated ACM limits appear to match quite well with the
existing data, as shown by a comparison of the \generated" and \actual" ACM limits for banks for
whom actual ACM limit data is available. The mean dierence between the generated and actual
ACM limits for such banks is 0.003 and -0.233 for the periods October 1997 - December 1999 and
January 2000 - December 2009, respectively. Furthermore, 69.01% of the actual ACM limits and
66.53% of the generated ACM limits fall within [19, 21], although the generated ACM limits are
slightly more skewed away from 20. Nevertheless, these observations suggest that the generated
ACM limits are a reasonable proxy for the (unobserved) actual ACM limits.
Table 12: Results of Tobit regressions used to generate the missing ACM limit data. Dependent
variable: the ACM limit for each bank, averaged over the entire period.
Oct. 1997 - Dec. 1999 Jan. 2000 - Dec. 2009
Coef S. E. Coef S. E.
Assets 0.003 0.011 0.006 0.007
Liquid -4.836 5.537 -7.174 2.443
Big Six -0.258 2.901 3.554 2.545
Foreign -0.417 1.452 2.641 1.130
T&L -1.868 1.620 0.948 1.216
Sub 0.928 0.913 1.851 0.836
Constant 20.453 1.484 17.907 1.047
No. of obs. 48 52
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.103
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